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Performance evaluation and 
the potential biases in fund 
manager return databases 
History may judge us all but when it comes to the databases 
that can provide a clue to past fund manager performance, 
ANDREW AINSWORTH, DAVID GALLAGHER and 
PETER GARDNER discover that there is the potential for bias.
Performance measurement is critical to our understanding fund manager ability. However, one important aspect 
of the performance evaluation process 
relies on the construction and 
maintenance of databases containing 
historical fund manager performance 
records. Recent evidence in the US 
suggests that biases in fund data can 
lead to significant problems in 
accurately quantifying the universe of 
funds’ performance. In particular, 
survivorship bias and incubation bias 
represent some of the most problematic 
issues for researchers. 
Our study provides an opportunity to 
assess the integrity of one historical 
fund performance database, and 
therefore allow for accurate inferences 
regarding managerial ability. We find 
minor evidence that both survivorship 
and backfill biases are present in a 
highly regarded and widely used 
database. However, this does not lead to 
a directional bias in the database which 
would otherwise lead to inconsistent 
inferences being drawn on managerial 
ability.
The most predominant bias we 
observe is due to alterations in fund 
histories for months where a return was 
previously reported (i.e. a record 
change), although it does not lead to a 
systematic bias. We also explore the 
reported returns between newly added 
and pre-existing fund managers, and 
find that newly added managers 
generally outperform extant managers.
This may give rise to a selection bias, 
but this is expected to exist in databases 
of this nature.
There are a variety of potential biases 
documented in performance evaluation 
studies:
• Survivorship bias arises when a 
manager’s return series is removed 
from a database following liquidation 
or a merger with another entity. If 
these fund managers have generally 
underperformed their peers, the 
exclusion of their return histories 
would otherwise inflate the average 
returns of the surviving managers. 
• Backfilling (or instant history) bias 
arises where new managers selectively 
report the (superior) returns achieved 
in periods prior to the date of their 
actual inclusion in the database. 
Incubation is one explanation for the 
backfilling bias. 
• Incubation bias occurs where 
managers operate a number of funds 
as private and discrete portfolios, and 
then subsequently decide to publicly 
offer only the best performing 
fund(s), thus generating a superior 
return history that is then backfilled 
within a database. 
• A selection bias would be present if 
investment managers in the sample 
did not accurately represent the 
population of fund managers. 
SURVIVORSHIP AND BACKFILL BIASES
The data employed in this study is 
sourced from the Mercer Investment 
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percent in the December 1996 dataset to 17.7 percent in 
September 2005, with changes of 0.9, zero and 0.2 percent in 
the intervening snapshots. 
Three potential explanations for the differences in the 
values reported in Table 2 are survivorship bias, the 
backfilling of historical returns (for months where a fund 
did not previously report returns) and a record change bias 
(where a fund’s previously reported returns are altered). 
TABLE 2 ANNUAL MANAGER RETURNS AND PERFORMANCE
Data download date Dec 1996 Sept 1999 Dec 2002 Sept 2005
Panel A: Average manager return
1992 0.75% 0.19% 0.09% -0.07%
1993 47.42% 47.40% 47.31% 47.61%
1994 -7.47% -7.41% -7.45% -7.37%
1995 19.85% 19.93% 19.89% 19.94%
1996 16.62% 17.49% 17.49% 17.67%
1997 n/a 14.20% 14.19% 13.93%
1998 n/a 11.85% 11.89% 11.39%
1999 n/a n/a 19.40% 19.27%
2000 n/a n/a 8.51% 8.66%
2001 n/a n/a 12.09% 12.10%
2002 n/a n/a -8.57% -8.22%
Panel B: Median manager return
1992 -0.17% -0.47% -0.47% -0.74%
1993 46.28% 46.28% 46.11% 46.34%
1994 -7.60% -7.62% -7.63% -7.63%
1995 19.75% 19.57% 19.57% 19.60%
1996 15.99% 16.11% 16.09% 16.04%
1997 n/a 13.61% 13.53% 13.46%
1998 n/a 12.17% 12.21% 12.04%
1999 n/a n/a 17.82% 17.83%
2000 n/a n/a 8.93% 8.90%
2001 n/a n/a 11.12% 11.25%
2002 n/a n/a -8.43% -8.11%
Panel C: Average percent of managers out-performing
1992 61.8% 60.0% 60.2% 59.4%
1993 54.1% 54.7% 52.7% 55.1%
1994 51.2% 54.6% 55.7% 55.0%
1995 50.3% 47.2% 49.1% 47.5%
1996 60.0% 60.0% 63.0% 60.7%
1997 n/a 56.9% 58.3% 56.3%
1998 n/a 50.2% 51.6% 49.6%
1999 n/a n/a 56.9% 57.2%
2000 n/a n/a 63.0% 64.0%
2001 n/a n/a 54.8% 56.1%
2002 n/a n/a 53.9% 55.4%
n/a = not applicable.
Analytics (MPA) database for specialist Australian active 
equity managers. As asset consultants, Mercer use the 
database as an input into their process of short-listing fund 
managers for their superannuation clients that are likely to 
yield superior performance in the future. As such, the MPA 
database does not include all possible managers in the 
investment universe, and it is likely that some form of 
selection bias may exist (although this is expected to be small). 
Four MPA database snapshots at approximately three-year 
intervals are used to undertake the analysis — downloads for 
the periods ending 31 December 1996, 30 September 1999, 
31 December 2002 and 30 September 2005. The selection of 
these particular dates was based on limited availability of 
data, with Vanguard Investments Australia providing the 
earliest data snapshot. We must also point out that Mercer 
removed the equity component of diversified funds from the 
specialist funds database in April 2000. As this is not a 
survivorship issue we added these funds back to the specialist 
funds to comprise our sample. 
Where a specialist fund was used as the equity component 
of a diversified fund, we removed that fund to avoid 
including its return series twice. Mercer provided data on the 
equity component of the diversified funds that were removed 
from the MPA database in April 2000. Passive and socially 
responsible managers are excluded from the analysis.2  
Table 1 documents the entry and exit of managers between 
consecutive download series. There were in excess of 20 new 
managers added to the database between each snapshot. In 
terms of non-surviving funds, six funds ceased reporting 
based on the four periods used in our analysis. There were 22 
instances of backfilling between the four datasets under 
examination. It must be noted that from April 1999, Mercer 
Investment Consulting altered its process on the inclusion of 
new funds’ return histories, limiting it to three months for 
new entrants in their survey.
TABLE 1 FUND ENTRY AND EXIT
Dec 96 Sept 99 Dec 02 Sept 05
Survivors n/a 65 94 120
Exits n/a 3 1 2
Entries n/a 30 28 21
Total 68 95 122 141
Backfilled n/a 16 4 2
n/a = not applicable.
Table 2 presents the annualised average and median 
manager returns, as well as the percentage of funds that 
outperformed the market index for the period between 1992 
and 2002. A preliminary examination of Table 2 reveals that 
all three statistics change between survey periods, though the 
sign of the change is not consistent. For example, if we look 
at 1992, the average return decreased from over 0.7 percent 
in December 1996 to about –0.1 percent in September 2005. 
Conversely, for 1996, the average return increased from 16.6 
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Table 3 documents the size of these three biases for each year 
from 1992 to 2002.3 A positive number indicates that the 
exclusion of non-surviving funds and backfilling of returns 
has created an upward bias in returns over time. In 1996, the 
average manager return has increased by 105 basis points as a 
result of these three biases. At the other extreme, the 
minimum total bias is –82 basis points in 1992. As such, the 
bias that does exist in the database is somewhat directionless, 
and does not consistently inflate the returns of active 
managers over time. In other words, the few funds that exit 
are not necessarily the worst performers. Those funds that 
have their return histories backfilled are not strictly 
backfilling good performance. And more importantly, 
survivorship and backfill bias do not explain the majority of 
the total returns difference across time, with more than half 
of the absolute deviations a result of changes in fund records 
between surveys. Also, the backfill bias is substantially smaller 
in the latter years of our sample, consistent with Mercer’s 
policy change that only three months of historical returns 
were to be reported by newly added funds after April 1999. 
TABLE 3 ANNUAL DATABASE BIASES
Backfill bias Survivorship bias Record change Total
1992 -16 -10 -56 -82
1993 56 35 -72 19
1994 -13 12 11 10
1995 7 -1 3 9
1996 55 9 41 105
1997 1 -1 -26 -26
1998 -3 -1 -42 -46
1999 -5 0 -8 -13
2000 -1 0 16 16
2001 2 0 -1 1
2002 2 15 18 35
From the analysis above, we can conclude that the presence 
of survivorship, backfilling and record change biases in the 
MPA database generally inflates the average returns of active 
equity managers by only three basis points per annum 
between 1992 and 2002. This is equivalent to one-fifth of a 
basis point per month. However, based on our four 
snapshots, the survivorship and backfill biases are less 
prevalent in the latter part of our sample. The five years to 
December 1996 reveals an average upward bias of 27 basis 
points per annum for these two biases, compared to less 
than two basis points per year for the six years to December 
2002. This is to be expected though, as there is limited 
opportunity for managers to backfill returns relative to the 
early part of our sample following Mercer’s policy change. 
In terms of the record change bias, this averages –14 basis 
points in the first half of the sample versus –7 basis points 
in the second half. 
There is one caveat that must be noted however. The results 
we find are, to a certain extent, dependent on the download 
periods employed. As such, they should be interpreted as 
indicative. The number of non-surviving managers may differ 
between different download periods. Also, we are unable to 
perfectly capture the backfill bias given our fixed time event 
periods. 
SAMPLE SELECTION, NEW FUND AND INCUBATION BIASES
An issue of similar importance to the biases discussed above 
is whether the recently added managers are reflective of the 
entire universe of fund managers, or if a selection bias exists 
that inflates the performance of active equity managers. 
Intuitively, a selection bias would be present, as managers 
that do not perform well have little incentive to seek 
inclusion in databases, as well as the difficulty of achieving 
acceptance from intermediaries in the market. 
We also explore the issue of fund incubation, as the newly 
added funds may have generated a superior return history 
prior to their public offer that may not be othrwise sustained 
following their inclusion in the database. For example, it is 
widely accepted that successful boutiques perform very 
strongly in the formative years, and once cash inflows become 
significant, alpha generation becomes more challenging than 
previously.
In order to ascertain the magnitude of this bias, fund 
managers are partitioned as either newly added (denoted 
‘new’) or pre-existing (‘old’). For the more recent dataset 
‘new’ is defined as those managers that reported in the 
September 2005 sample but were not included in the 
December 2002 sample. ‘Old’ managers are those that were 
present in both samples. As such, the period over which we 
can examine differences in manager returns is limited to 
those months between January 2003 and September 2005, 
inclusive. Similar classifications are undertaken based on the 
December 2002, September 1999 and December 1996 return 
series to provide additional samples to investigate. 
To maximise the degrees of freedom, the returns for each 
manager type are pooled together over time. The 1999 
sample aggregates returns between January 1997 and 
September 1999. For the 2002 sample, this period is from 
October 1999 to December 2002 and for the 2005 sample, it 
is between January 2003 and September 2005. 
Analysis of a t-test for a difference in means for new and 
old managers is presented in Table 4. New managers in the 
1999 sample significantly outperform old managers by 14 
basis points per month. The addition of new managers to the 
database leads to a 4 basis point increase in total average 
return per month, or 48 basis points per year. 
The 2002 sample of new managers achieve monthly excess 
returns that are 16 basis points higher than the old managers, 
on average, with a reported p-value of 1 percent. If we 
compare the average monthly excess return for old managers 
with that of the new and old managers combined, we can see 
that the inclusion of new managers in the sample increases 
the average monthly excess return by 2.6 basis points per 
month or 0.3 percent on an annualised basis. Similarly with 
the 2005 dataset, the difference between the two manager 
groups is statistically significant with a 13 basis point 
difference in excess returns per month. 
INVESTMENT 
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sourced from Mercer Investment Consulting. While we find 
some minor evidence of survivorship bias and backfill bias 
affecting returns in the early years of the database, these 
biases have become less substantial in the later years of our 
sample, and this result can be explained by the 
enhancements executed by Mercer Investment Consulting. 
Changes in fund records comprise the majority of the 
difference in returns between surveys. This leads us to 
conclude that, while survivorship and backfill bias are 
present, their impact is likely to be minimal. However, we 
find evidence that newly added managers perform better 
than pre-existing managers, and that this selection bias is 
likely to enhance the overall ability of active equity managers 
as a group relative to the original universe of managers. 
However, this is somewhat expected, as the Mercer database 
is not static in time and has needed to adapt to capture new 
players in the market. That said, further investigation of the 
performance differential between these two groups might be 
an avenue for future research. In addition, the usefulness of 
the Mercer database to clients indeed relies on the universe of 
funds included to have up-to-date information, including the 
capability of relatively recent starters, such as boutiques. 
Overall, our study confirms that the Mercer database is well-
managed and the significance of database biases is indeed 
small in nature. 
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Consulting (2001). However there are key differences between 
the two datasets. Our sample is comprised of four snapshots, 
rather than quarterly surveys and we include only active 
managers. Our data is sourced electronically, whereas the 
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electronic copies if retrospective changes to the database have 
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Despite the majority of manager returns having an 
insignificant difference between the two periods, 9 percent of 
managers did perform significantly better in their first year of 
reported operations versus the subsequent performance. In 
terms of the three-year performance sub-group, 15 percent of 
managers had excess returns that were significantly higher in 
their early years. 
In contrast only 2 percent of managers performed 
significantly worse in their first year, relative to their post-
first year performance. Two percent of managers had a 
negative and significant difference between their first three 
years of returns and those achieved subsequently. 
Ignoring statistical significance momentarily, 64 percent of 
managers performed better in their first year and 72 percent 
of managers reaped higher returns in the first three years 
relative to that achieved subsequently. This lends support to 
the idea that some positive bias does exist as a result of 
adding new managers to the database. The outperformance 
by new managers could be a result of fund incubation. An 
alternative explanation from Chan, Faff, Gallagher and Looi 
(2005) is that pre-existing, and more likely larger, funds suffer 
performance erosion from both flow-induced purchases and 
attempts to avoid market impact costs. Newly added 
managers are likely to be smaller in size than pre-existing 
managers and are therefore more likely to avoid these two 
adverse factors.
TABLE 6 DIFFERENCE IN EXCESS RETURN ACROSS TIME 
FOR EACH MANAGER
One year Three years
No. managers Percent No. managers Percent
Positive & 
Significant 11 9.4% 13 15.1%
Negative & 
Significant 2 1.7% 2 2.3%
Positive & 
Insignificant 64 54.7% 49 57.0%
Negative & 
Insignificant 40 34.2% 22 25.6%
Total 117 86
CONCLUSION
Performance measurement is critical to our understanding 
fund manager ability, in terms of the selection, monitoring 
and review of funds management institutions. One important 
aspect of the performance evaluation process relies on the 
construction and maintenance of databases containing 
historical fund manager performance records. Surprisingly, in 
Australia little published work exists on this topic, such that 
we are able to achieve a better understanding of the integrity 
of historical fund performance databases. 
Using a case study approach, our research explores the 
extent to which certain biases are present in a well used and 
highly respected institutional fund performance database, 
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CORRECTION
Benchmarking Discriminatory Power of 
Credit Risk Rating Models 
D.H. Liyana Arachchige, JASSA, Journal of FINSIA, 
Issue 1, Autumn 2007, pp 6–12
Due to an oversight, the last equation on page 9 is 
incorrect in the above paper. The author 
unreservedly apologises for this error and asks the 
readers to note the following changes. The Z values 
given in each row of Table 2 in the paper should be 
multiplied by the factor, 2(g+b)/g using the values in 
the corresponding rows for the columns labelled 
‘Goods (g)' and ‘Bads (b)' in Table 1. This change 
leads to three more failures for the last four Z values 
in Table 2. Figure 2 is also slightly affected and the 
second paragraph on page 10 should be read 
accordingly. The corrected version of the paper can 
be obtained by writing to the author’s email address 
given in the paper. The following formula 
encompasses the above changes. 
(2(g+b)/g)(A–A' )
V(G)+V(G ’) – 2Cov(G,G ' )
Z = 
where g and b are respectively total number of non-
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TABLE A1 





1992 -16 103 -55 31
1993 56 166 -84 137
1994 -13 86 4 77
1995 7 34 -31 11
1996 55 144 34 233
1997 1 23 -43 -19
1998 -4 21 -39 -22
1999 -7 0 -20 -27
2000 -2 0 1 0
2001 2 0 -26 -24
2002 2 19 9 30
TABLE A2 





1992 -12 -13 -32 -58
1993 -15 12 9 6
1994 -20 15 2 -3
1995 -7 -2 -7 -15
1996 2 17 -15 5
1997 -6 -3 -7 -16
1998 6 -5 -12 -12
1999 -1 0 2 1
2000 4 0 -7 -4
2001 5 0 8 13
2002 2 2 27 32
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